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Visual Jihad: Constructing the ‘Good Muslim’ in Online Jihadist Magazines 
Stuart Macdonald1 & Nuria Lorenzo-Dus2 
Abstract: 
Images are known to have important effects on human perception and persuasion. Jihadist 
groups are also known to make strategic use of emotive imagery and symbolism for persuasive 
ends. Yet until recently studies of the online magazines published by violent jihadist groups 
largely focused on their textual, not their image, content and, whilst the image content of these 
magazines is now the subject of a burgeoning number of studies, few of these compare the 
images used by different groups. This article accordingly offers a cross-group comparison, 
examining the image content of a total of 39 issues of five online magazines published by four 
different jihadist groups. Starting with a content analysis, it shows that the images’ most 
common focus is non-leader jihadis. Using a news values analysis, it then shows how these 
images of non-leader jihadis are used to visually construct the identity of a ‘good Muslim’. 
This construct is characterised by three traits, each corresponding to a different news value: 
fulfilled (personalisation); active (consonance); and, respected (prominence). Moreover, these 
traits are intertwined: fulfilment comes from responding actively to the call to violent jihad, 
which in turn promises respect. The article concludes by highlighting some subtle differences 
between how the news values of personalisation, consonance and prominence are realised in 
the different magazines, and by discussing the implications of the ‘good Muslim’ construct for 
efforts to develop counter-messages. 
Keywords: terrorism, counterterrorism, images, identity 
Introduction 
                                                           
1 College of Law & Criminology, Swansea University, UK. 
2 College of Arts & Humanities, Swansea University, UK. 
There is a growing body of research into the information operation (IO) machinery operated 
by violent jihadist ideology groups and, specifically, the content of the messages that they 
disseminate for propagandistic purposes.1 This literature agrees on the need to avoid 
generalisations, given these groups’ heterogeneity and constant evolution.2 It also 
acknowledges the need for detailed analyses of their discursive strategies in order to contribute 
to crafting more nuanced and effective counter-messages.3 Whilst undoubtedly a positive 
development, this relatively recent interest in the study of jihadists’ propagandistic discourse 
is still lacking in two key areas,4 to which this article seeks to contribute. One concerns self-
(jihadi) identity construction, as opposed both to other-identity construction (including of 
jihadists’ enemies) and institutional (e.g. media or government) constructions of jihadi 
identities. The other refers to the visual – rather than linguistic – aspects of these groups’ 
identity construction. Whilst there is a burgeoning number of visual studies of online jihadist 
magazines, few of these have adopted a comparative approach.  
Given the above, the study reported in this article sought to identify and examine the visual 
representation strategies used in five online magazines published over a period of six-and-a-
half years by four groups that follow a violent jihadist ideology. The five magazines are Azan 
(published by the Taliban in Khurasan), Dabiq (published by the so-called Islamic State 
(hereafter “IS”)), Gaidi Mtaani (published by Al Shabaab), Inspire (published by Al Qaeda in 
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)) and Jihad Recollections (also published by AQAP5). The 
period under consideration spans 1st January 2009 to 30th June 2015. Jihadist groups, including 
the four considered in our study, are known to rely upon varying combinations of pragmatic 
and perceptual factors in their propaganda messages. The former include references to stability, 
security and livelihoods, which the groups use both to promote their politico-military 
campaigns and to denigrate the politico-military efforts of their enemies. The latter seek to 
leverage “logic of appropriateness” decision making processes, that is, choices made according 
to jihadists’ perceived self- and other- identity.6 Such choices are typically presented in the 
groups’ online propaganda as polarised, us-versus-them argumentative structures, in which the 
out-group (the ‘they’) is othered and the in-group (the ‘we’) becomes the only solution for the 
in-group’s perceived crisis.7 Whereas there are a number of studies that examine out-group 
constructions, including through othering, within jihadi groups’ online propaganda,8 research 
into their in-group constructions is comparatively less developed. This is particularly 
significant given that there is evidence that suggests that it is the values a group attributes to 
itself – and not the values a group attributes to its opponents – that is predictive of the group’s 
willingness to engage in terrorist activity.9 Specifically, and given the groups’ polarised 
argumentation tactics, we focus on how they construct visually the identity of ‘the good 
Muslim’ – someone worth emulating – within their online magazines. As for our focus on 
jihadi visual identity, this reflects both the salience that images have on human perception and 
persuasion in mediated communication (see below) and the fact that jihadist groups are known 
to make strategic use of emotive imagery and symbolism for persuasive ends.10  
The article is structured as follows. First, we review the literature on jihadist groups’ IO 
machinery, with a focus on their online propaganda communications. We then review the role 
played by images and other visual resources within jihadist propaganda, explaining the link 
between them and ideology and identity construction processes in digital environments. In the 
next section, we introduce our methodological approach, which integrates content and news 
values analysis of all the images in our corpus. We then report and discuss the main findings 
of our two strands of analysis, explaining how these magazines visually construct the ‘good 
Muslim’ identity. Finally, we conclude by briefly identifying some implications of our 
findings. 
 
Identity Construction in Online Jihadist Magazines 
In the days before the internet, terrorist groups generally had to rely on traditional news media 
outlets to depict their justifications and motivations, and the details of their attacks.11 Today, 
by contrast, such groups are able to produce propaganda, with direct control over its contents, 
and disseminate it widely online.12 It is thus unsurprising that the dissemination of propaganda 
has been found to be one of the primary uses of the internet by terrorist groups.13 A wide variety 
of multimedia have been used, including literature, videos, songs, images, comics and video 
games.14 Terrorist groups also utilise social media, including both high-profile platforms such 
as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube and lower-profile ones such as Telegram and 
SoundCloud.15 An important part of these efforts has been the production of online magazines. 
These publications seek to articulate a comprehensive message and vision, as well as serving 
as an outreach tool to incite or recruit new followers.16  
Since the first issue of AQAP’s English-language magazine Inspire was published in 2010, 
there have been several analyses of its contents.17 Pointing to how Inspire seeks to normalize 
the jihadist message by shoehorning “otherwise disturbing content … into a familiar visual and 
textual format that stylistically suggests a lighter tone and popular-culture content”,18 coupled 
with the way in which the magazine conveys an impression of “coolness and popularity”,19 
Sivek concludes that it may aid readers through the stages of self-radicalization by making 
“altering personal beliefs and social norms seem reasonable and socially acceptable”.20 
Droogan and Peattie’s analysis of Inspire’s narrative themes found that these could be grouped 
into four broad categories – anti-Western, call to arms, religion and local issues – with the 
global theme “Islam is at War”.21 Whilst the low-level themes within these four categories 
underwent shifts in response to real-world events, these four categories remained constant 
across all fourteen issues analysed. Lemieux et al examined eleven issues of Inspire, assessing 
the extent to which its contents corresponded with the Information-Motivation-Behavioral 
skills model of behavioural change. They concluded that the information, motivation and skills 
elements of this model are all present in the magazine’s pages (deliberately or otherwise), and 
that “Taken together, these elements significantly enhance the potential efficacy of Inspire to 
engender terrorism”.22 Lastly, Kirke has emphasised the importance of political myth in 
Inspire, in terms of both simplifying complex realities and constructing in-group and out-group 
identities.23 
There have also been analyses of Dabiq. First published in 2014, Dabiq was the flagship 
English-language magazine of IS until September 2016 (when it was abandoned in favour of a 
new magazine, Rumiyah). Colas states that understanding of Dabiq may be advanced by 
investigating its implied audiences, which he argues were English-speaking second generation 
Muslims or converts, Western policymakers and current or would-be members of IS who were 
not integrating with the organization itself.24 Colas also observes that articles aimed at the third 
of these audiences were “astonishingly frank” about the organizational challenges IS faces and 
thus provide information that may be used against it.25 Christien’s analysis focuses specifically 
on the representation of youth. She concludes that children and youth are portrayed 
predominantly in passive roles – as weak or victimized and as objects or commodities – and 
that IS displays children in ways that foster state building and glorify the group, though she 
notes an evolution in the later issues in which youth are increasingly empowered and portrayed 
in active roles, especially violent ones.26 Macdonald has examined how the producers of Dabiq 
seek to induce behavioural change in its readers. Using the framework of responsive regulation, 
he argues that the magazine uses a variety of persuasive techniques that are analogous to those 
used by regulators: promises of (physical and spiritual) benefits; issuing warnings that 
punishment for non-adherents is inescapable, yet simultaneously avoiding resort to the use of 
bare threats that would generate reactance; and, reinforcing sympathizers’ willingness to self-
identify with IS by portraying the group as fair, in both a substantive and a procedural sense.27 
And Ingram has explained that Dabiq prioritized dichotomy-reinforcing messages, presenting 
a “competitive system of meaning” in which readers are plunged “into a bi-polar world, 
characterised by cosmic war and on the verge of End Times, that demands Sunnis choose 
between the forces of good or evil. Through this lens, becoming a foreign fighter or lone wolf 
terrorist is obligatory for any true Sunni”.28 Ingram has applied the same theoretical framework 
to Azan, the magazine produced by the Taliban in Khurasan. As well as finding that Azan 
employs a variety of narrative approaches to appeal to diverse readerships at potentially 
different stages of radicalization, Ingram found that the majority of items in Azan were linked 
to value-reinforcing narratives. The magazine, he concludes, focuses on empowering its 
readership by positively constructing the in-group identity using values such as piety, honour, 
courage and love.29 
The studies referred to hitherto focus on the magazine of a specific group. Whilst useful, a 
cross-cutting approach enables the identification of subtle differences in the groups’ narratives. 
Our study accordingly adopts such an approach, specifically seeking to ascertain what identity 
construction features these differences may bring about, and how this is visually achieved. The 
potential of a cross-cutting approach to advance understanding of these publications, and 
inform the construction of tailored responses, is illustrated by Novernario’s study of the 
strategic logics used by AQAP in Inspire and IS in Dabiq. Employing a content analysis 
methodology, she found that, whilst both groups made significant use of outbidding as a 
strategy, there were differences in their use of other strategic logics. Attrition was used far more 
frequently by AQAP to try and compel changes in the West’s policy and behaviour, whereas 
intimidation was scarcely used by AQAP but was a key strategy for IS. These differences, she 
argues, reflect the differing objectives of the two groups.30 Similarly, Ingram has compared 
Dabiq with Inspire, finding that, whilst Inspire relies heavily on identity-choice appeals, Dabiq 
tended to balance identity and rational choice messaging: 
By simultaneously compelling readers to perceive the world through bifurcated in- and 
outgroup identity constructs and demonstrating how IS are tangibly addressing real 
Sunni crises (e.g., Sunni persecution and disempowerment) with real solutions (i.e., 
IS's politico-military agenda), Dabiq seeks to align its readership’s identity- and 
rational-choice decision-making processes as a means to win their support and mobilize 
them to action as a matter of urgency. 31 
For their part, Lorenzo-Dus and Macdonald examined the discursive strategies used to other 
‘the West’ in Dabiq and Inspire across a five and a half year period (January 2010 – June 
2015).32 Their analysis shows that, although both magazines employed an othering discourse 
saliently when referring to ‘the West’, they did so (i) with different frequencies of use (73.58% 
in Dabiq and 91.79% in Inspire of all references to ‘the West’); (ii) by associating ‘the West’ 
with different extra-linguistic realities (i.e., America, Western troops / armies and Western 
allies were more frequently referenced in Inspire than in Dabiq and, conversely, Western 
leaders and crusaders were more frequently referenced in Dabiq than in Inspire); and (iii) by 
assigning salience to different impoliteness strategies33 (Dabiq favoured the use of threats and 
condescension over exclusionary discourse, whereas the opposite was the case in Inspire).  
 
Images, Identity and Persuasion in Online Jihadist Magazines 
The use of images in media discourse is widely known to have several important effects broadly 
aligned to persuasion. Firstly, images grab audiences’ attention more than words do. For 
instance, the incorporation of photographs into news texts is known to draw attention to the 
texts and foster more extensive reading of them.34 And, where agonistic imagery is used (such 
as photographs depicting victimization), information processing is more extensive.35   
Secondly, whilst the impact of image content will hinge on the “complex relation between 
between specific images and the underlying beliefs, narratives and ideologies held to by 
particular audiences,”36 there exists the potential for visual content to be taken at face value, 
especially when embedded within non-fictional media genres such as news photography.37 It 
seems that we are less skilled at guarding our judgment against visual than verbal persuasion.38 
Whilst most have been schooled and trained in textual rhetoric and can discern attempts at 
verbal manipulation, the image can fall beneath notice.39 Images may be perceived as mere 
excretions of a technical apparatus, and hence as neutral bearers of truth,40 such that the 
authentication of the image trumps the representation of the word.41 
Thirdly, images can evoke a powerful and lasting emotional response.42 A study by Huddy and 
Gunnthorsdottir, which evaluated two different explanations for the persuasive impact of 
emotional visual appeals within politics, found that it was those most committed to a cause that 
were most influenced by emotive appeals. The study therefore concluded that emotive appeals 
are a means by which to arouse one’s supporters.43 Furthermore, visual information is 
processed more easily and is more memorable than verbal information on its own,44 the so-
called “picture superiority effect”.45  
Fourthly, images may be employed as thematic cues. The iconic ability of images to seemingly 
reproduce reality makes them powerful persuasive means in support of  “commonsensical” 
ideology and identity claims, whilst also enabling them to  “subtly camouflage” the constructed 
roots of such claims.46 An image, for example, can provide “transcending frames of cultural 
mythology or social narratives in which the viewer/reader is led to process and interpret other 
information on the page or screen”.47 The capacity of visual frames to influence interpretation 
of a news event, such as a terrorist attack, is particularly evident in the context of foreign news, 
when audiences may have limited knowledge of a place, people, and events.48 Images can 
therefore play a key role in shaping the parameters of public debate following a terrorist 
attack,49 and in shaping a nation’s collective memory of the attack.50  
All in all, the persuasive power of images – coupled with states’ reduced ability in today’s 
digital sharing era51 to control messages about the conflicts in which they are engaged – has 
resulted in their “weaponization”.52 In this “image war” each side attempts to portray its ideas, 
beliefs and actions as justified and presents itself as the victim, “understanding that this frame 
attracts more media attention and receives more sympathy from the audience”.53 A politics of 
identity has ensued, in which images and emotional accounts reinforce the notion that “we” 
have been targeted and are under threat.54 Volpato et al detail the various delegitimization 
strategies that may be employed to communicate prejudiced beliefs, maintain the in-group’s 
sense of superiority and uniformity, and provide the in-group with a justification for negative 
behaviours towards the out-group.55 Case studies include Seo’s study of the images posted on 
Twitter by the Israel Defense Forces and Al Qassam Brigades during the 2012 Israeli-Hamas 
conflict, which focused on the death, injuries and suffering of innocent civilians alongside a 
framing of the other side as cold-blooded killers,56 and Spens’ study of the Abu Ghraib 
photographs, which dehumanized the Other for political purposes.57 
It is unsurprising, then, that terrorist groups seek to utilise visual media in their propaganda and 
psychological warfare campaigns.58 As early as the mid-2000s, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) tasked 
its photography supervisors with producing monthly work plans and training more people in 
photography.59 El Damanhoury et al have explained that IS regards military action and media 
operations as “two sides of the same jihad coin”,60 pointing out that in the online visual sphere 
even the weakest side in a military conflict can “define the conflict and the concept of victory 
moving forward”.61 Kraidy has argued that IS considers images to be operative, not merely 
representational: in visual warfare “images trigger intensities in addition to conveying 
ideologies”.62 
Whilst at first scholarship on online jihadist magazines largely focused on their textual content, 
there is now a growing number of visual studies. These have highlighted how Dabiq magazine 
makes use of images that project a positive image of health and welfare within the Caliphate,63 
as well as derogatory images of IS’s enemies to position the group’s adherents and opponents 
within a dichotomous ideological framework,64 and of the IS flag to construct a brand.65 
Perhaps the most in-depth set of studies are those of Winker et al. These have examined the 
visual strategies IS used to create and define the community boundaries of the self-declared 
caliphate in its first two years,66 the differences between the images contained in Dabiq and 
IS’s Arabic-language newspaper al-Naba’,67 and the use in Dabiq of the about to die trope.68 
The latter study found that the “reality depicted in Dabiq images was that Daesh would 
determine who would die next, and those at risk of dying would overwhelmingly be those who 
failed to adopt, adhere to, or otherwise pledge allegiance to the group and its ideology”.69 The 
study also noted that “the bulk of the published scholarship analysing Dabiq largely focuses 
on the text of the magazine”,70 a point that has been echoed in studies of Inspire. For example, 
Lemieux et al have observed that “Going forward, research in this domain should further 
examine the imagery used in Inspire in a more detailed and systematic manner”,71 whilst in 
their study Droogan and Peattie state: 
Given its focus on textual narrative themes, this research cannot account for the relative 
influence that Inspire’s images may have on potential radicals over its textual 
arguments. Indeed, the magazine does make frequent use of captivating, professional 
imagery. Some of these images are powerful in their own right, and the results of a 
textual thematic analysis do not capture their pervasiveness or their ability to captivate 
audiences.72  
Our work seeks to respond to this call for a detailed and systematic analysis of visuals in online 
jihadist magazines. In particular, and in contrast to existing visual studies of these publications, 
it examines the image content of the magazines published by four different jihadist groups. As 
the cross-group textual studies outlined above have demonstrated, such a comparative approach 





Data for this study came from a wider project that examined various aspects of persuasion in 
online terrorist magazines, such as their othering discourse, the role of religion and politics and 
gender.73 Data for the project spanned a five-and-a-half-year period (1st January 2009 – 30 June 
2015), the end point of which coincided with the start date of the project. In addition to being 
published within this period, the following data inclusion were applied: firstly, the publication 
had to be a magazine (as opposed to some other type of publication, such as a newsletter or a 
transcript of a speech). Secondly, reflecting our focus on the dissemination of terrorist 
propaganda via the internet, it had to have been published online. Thirdly, reflecting our focus 
on cross-group as opposed to cross-language comparisons, it had to have been published in the 
English language. 
Although there was no predetermined intention to focus on a particular form of violent 
extremism, the five magazines that met the criteria for inclusion were all published by groups 
that follow a jihadist ideology. The five magazines were: Jihad Recollections, published by 
AQAP (four issues, all published in 2009); Inspire, also published by AQAP (13 issues, 
published from 2010-2014); Gaidi Mtaani, published by Al Shabaab (seven issues, published 
from 2012-2015); Azan, published by the Taliban in Khurasan (six issues, published in 2013-
2014); and, Dabiq, published by IS (nine issues, published in 2014-2015).  
To the best of our knowledge, every issue of each of the five magazines that was published 
within the relevant time period was included within the dataset. This totalled 39 issues. The 
magazines contained a variety of different types of item, from creative works and interviews 
to eulogies and instructional guides. As Table 1 shows, by far the most common type of item 
in all five magazines was articles. In addition to providing purportedly objective reports of 
current events, the articles also addressed issues of wider (political, religious and historical) 
interest and sought to engage in academic discussion and debate.74 


























































































































































The 39 issues contained a total of 3869 images.75 The distribution of these images – which 
formed the corpus for our study – is shown in Table 2. 
Table 2: Analytic corpus 
 Number of images across 
all issues 
Image / issue ratio 
Image / page 
ratio 
Azan 494 82 1.68 
Dabiq 760 84 1.52 
Gaidi Mtaani 386 55 2.05 
Inspire 1719 132 2.76 
Jihad Recollections 510 128 1.86 
Total 3869 99 2.06 
 
As this table shows, there were significant differences between the magazines. The two AQAP 
magazines, Jihad Recollections and Inspire, contained a higher quantity of images, with an 
average of 128 and 132 images per issue and 1.86 and 2.76 images per page respectively. By 
contrast Dabiq contained 84 images per issue and 1.52 images per page: the lowest images per 
page ratio of any of the magazines.  
Procedure and Framework 
Our methodological framework integrated image content and news values visual analysis. The 
former was informed by a Grounded Theory approach,76 whereby we identified relevant image 
content categories in our corpus, progressively funnelling down from the magazine level to 
relevant image features. These categories included: 
a) What was being depicted in focus, e.g. a landscape, a city, a vehicle, human figure/s, 
etc.; and, 
b) In the case of human participants, who was being depicted. This was further divided 
into those who were jihadis and those who were not. Given our research interest in 
jihadi identity construction, we proceeded to analyse those images that placed jihadis 
in focus, noting: 
i. Whether the image placed one or more jihadi in focus; that is whether it 
individualised or collectivised jihadi representations; 
ii. Whether the jihadi/s in focus held an ‘elite’ or ‘non-elite’ status, that is, 
whether the primary focus of the image was on one or more publicly 
recognised jihadi leader (e.g. bin Laden, al-Awlaki, al-Zawahiri) or on one 
or more publicly non-recognised jihadi;77 and, 
iii. the activity in which the jihadi/s in the focus of the image appeared engaged, 
e.g., celebrating a military victory, religious observance, saluting, and so 
forth. 
As stated above, by far the most common type of item within the magazines was articles. For 
our visual analysis, we therefore chose to employ a News Values Discourse Analytic 
framework.78 This treats newsworthiness as “a discursive value that is established by language 
and image in use” - the latter being the focus of our analysis.79 The framework comprises of 
ten news values (prominence, proximity, negativity, superlativeness, impact, personalisation, 
timeliness, novelty, consonance and aesthetics), each of which may be realised by one or more 
visual devices (see Appendix 1a for news values definitions and a list of visual devices typically 
associated with each). Both participant-based and photographer-based devices are considered: 
the former concerns newsworthiness derived from “where and with whom they [participants] 
are photographed and how much or little of this is included in the image frame”.80 The latter 
includes photographic techniques such as shutter speed, lens aperture, angle and so forth. 
Although there is no one-to-one relationship between photographic techniques and news 
values, certain photographic techniques are able to construe more than one news value 
simultaneously, which may explain why they feature so frequently in news texts.81   
Coding news values visually was an iterative process that resulted in two data-led adaptations 
of the original framework - see Appendix 1b.82 Firstly, within the personalisation news value 
we also examined whether – and, if so, which – emotions were depicted in the images. We thus 
distinguished between three points in a continuum of emotions:  positive (joy, relaxation), 
neutral (indifference, seriousness) and negative (anger, sadness). Secondly, within the 
prominence news value, we identified the following markers of prominence: ‘artefacts’, 
‘weapons’, ‘religious status’, ‘clothing’, and ‘other’.  The ‘clothing’ marker was then further 
divided into the use of uniform and other regalia of officialdom.  In our corpus, moreover, it 
was not only the type of ‘official’ clothing depicted (e.g. military, Islam) but its (un)blemished 
condition, in the context of images depicting the aftermath of violence, that became relevant 
for coding purposes.   
Coding for the image content and the visual news values was independently conducted by a 
trained researcher and the paper authors. The visual news values coding resulted in a small 
number of inter-coder differences regarding the personalisation and consonance news values. 
These differences were resolved through discussion. 
 
Results  
Image content analysis 
In this section we report the main findings of our analysis of whether the images placed one or 
more jihadi in focus, their (non-)leader status and the activities they were portrayed as being 
engaged in. Our analysis of the main focus of each image resulted in a total of 19 different 
‘who or what?’ sub-categories. Table 3 shows the frequency of use of the 12 sub-categories for 
which there were at least 100 images. 
Table 3: Main focus of images (who/what depicted?) 
Image focus Number of images 
Jihadis 1198 (31.0%) 
People regarded as the “enemy” 545 (14.1%) 
Instructional guides 362 (9.4%) 
Landscapes 224 (5.8%) 
Civilians 173 (4.5%) 
Corpses 153 (4.0%) 
Buildings/landmarks 138 (3.6%) 
Vehicles 136 (3.5%) 
Flags 122 (3.2%) 
Advertisements/media 107 (2.8%) 
Weaponry 105 (2.7%) 
Religious 100 (2.6%) 
Other* 506 (13.1%) 
*less than 100 images per category 
The most common sub-category was jihadis (n=1198). This had more than double the number 
of images of the next most common sub-category, which was images of people regarded as the 
“enemy” (n=545). Together, these two sub-categories accounted for 45.1% of all images. This 
is illustrative of the othering process reported by studies of these magazines’ textual content.83 
Readers are repeatedly presented with images of the in-group and, to a lesser extent, the out-
group. These visual cues maintain the salience of the dichotomy these magazines seek to 
construct, pressing readers to decide which group they self-identify with.  
Table 4 shows the combined results of our analysis of the (non-)leader status and 
individualisation/collectivisation of the images that placed jihadi/s in focus. 
 
Table 4: Breakdown of images focusing on one or more jihadi and their (non-)leader status  




One individual 26.5% (n=40) 47.7% (n=72) N/A 
More than one individual 0% 25.2% (n=38) 0.7% (n=1) 
 
Dabiq 
One individual 10.5% (n=30) 34.7% (n=99) N/A 
More than one individual 0% 51.9% (n=148) 2.8% (n=8) 
 
Gaidi Mtaani 
One individual 6.6% (n=7) 64.2% (n=68) N/A 
More than one individual 0% 29.2% (n=31) 0% 
 
Inspire 
One individual 3.9% (n=17) 70.0% (n=305) N/A 
More than one individual 0% 25.0% (n=109) 1.1% (n=5) 
 
Jihad Recollections 
One individual 9.1% (n=20) 69.5% (n=153) N/A 
 
 
Whilst images containing jihadist leaders were present in each magazine, their overall 
frequency of use (n=131; 10.9%) was much lower than that of non-leadership figures (n=1067; 
89.1%). Table 4 also reveals an important difference between Azan and the rest of the 
magazines with regards to this finding. The proportion of images containing leadership figures 
in Azan (n=41; 27.2%) was significantly higher than for each of the other four magazines. This 
is in keeping with textual analysis of Azan that found that it contains a greater proportion of 
formal statements attributed to the group’s leadership structure than the other four magazines,84 
that it contains implied claims to divine truth and authority,85 and that the justifications 
employed in its articles are more frequently rooted in traditional sources of religious 
authority.86  
Only a handful of images (n=17; 1.4%) contained a jihadist leader with other people. These 
were not coded within the leader category because the focus was on both participant types. 
This distance between the leaders and their followers could be interpreted in terms of reverence 
for the leader, although given the repeated reuse of some images (of, e.g., al-Awlaki) it is 
probably better explained in terms of the limited number of available images of these 
individuals and in particular the scarcity of images of them interacting closely with ‘ordinary’ 
jihadis. Jihadist leader images tended to show them giving either a speech or interview, with 
prominent status indicators such as a microphone, flag or rows of books. Their facial 
expressions conveyed a sense of joy, contemplation, deep-thought and concentration. A sharp 
More than one individual 0% 20.0% (n=44) 1.4% (n=3) 
    
Total (n=1198)  
One individual 9.5% (n=114) 58.2% (n=697) N/A 
More than one individual 0% 30.9% (n=370) 1.4% (n=17) 
distinction was also drawn with the leaders of rival factions in the Middle East. Images of these 
rival leaders sought to Westernise them. So, whilst the leaders of the in-group were pictured in 
Islamic dress or military style clothing, rival leaders were pictured wearing Western clothing 
(e.g., a suit), often alongside further insignia associated with the out-group (e.g., the Syrian 
flag).  
As Table 4 also shows, across all five magazines the images of jihadis focused overwhelmingly 
on non-leaders (n=1067; 89.1%). More than half of the images of jihadis in our corpus were of 
a lone, non-leader jihadi (n=697; 58.2%). This trend was particularly salient in the two AQAP 
magazines, Inspire (n=305; 70.0%) and Jihad Recollections (n=153; 69.5%). This is consistent 
with the former’s stated objective – to inspire lone actor attacks against the West – and its other 
contents, especially its Open Source Jihad section, which contains step-by-step instructions for 
such things as building a bomb and using a firearm.87  
Dabiq was the only one of the five magazines that contained a higher proportion of images of 
groups of (non-leader) jihadis (n=148; 51.9%) than lone (non-leader) jihadis (n=99; 34.7%). 
Dabiq’s greater emphasis on group images is further demonstrated by Table 5, specifically the 
figures concerning per issue ratios of images containing individual or groups of (non-leader) 
jihadis. Dabiq contained an average of 16.4 images of groups of non-leader jihadis per issue, 
almost twice as many as the next highest figure (Inspire, 8.4 images per issue). So, whilst the 
image content of the other magazines, especially Inspire and Jihad Recollections, focussed on 
presenting (non-leader) jihadis as individuals, the image content of Dabiq placed greater 
emphasis on the individual’s status as a member of a group and the prominence of that group. 
 
Table 5: Frequency and ratio of images of individual and groups of non-leader jihadis. 
 
Number of images 
Ratio: Number of images per 
issue 
Individual Group Individual Group 
Azan 72 38 12 6.3 
Dabiq 99 148 11 16.4 
Gaidi Mtaani 68 31 9.7 4.4 
Inspire 305 109 23.5 8.4 
Jihad Recollections 153 44 38.3 11 
 
 
Table 6 shows the comparative frequencies of the range of activities in which non-leader jihadis 
appeared to be engaged. In all five magazines, the majority of images of non-leader jihadis 
were show of strength ones (that is, images that portrayed the group as a formidable force). 
These images typically pictured one or more individuals in Islamic dress or military style 
clothing, holding weapons, sometimes standing alongside a tank or other military vehicle or 
riding horses, with a serious or intimidating facial expression. Others showed groups of jihadis 
participating in firearms or physical training. Table 6 also reveals another respect in which 
Dabiq differed from the other four magazines. In the other magazines, there were very few 
images portraying celebratory scenes, community life or religious observance. Of the other 
magazines, the highest frequency for these three activities combined was 5.1% in Inspire. This 
compares to a figure of 18.2% for Dabiq. This supports Ingram’s finding that Dabiq employs 
greater diversity in its messaging.88 Whilst both Dabiq and Inspire contained images portraying 
community life (e.g., people embracing or smiling in conversation), Dabiq also contained a 
number of images of groups of jihadis celebrating victories and engaged in acts of religious 
observance (e.g., praying and listening to religious teaching). So unlike the other four 
magazines – which all utilised afterlife images to promise spiritual benefits in the hereafter89 – 
Dabiq focussed instead on the group’s status in the here-and-now, combining show of strength 
images with ones celebrating victories, and combining images of religious observance with 
ones of harmonious community life. 





















































































































* Some images were counted in more than one category (e.g. show of strength and 
celebratory scenes), and some images were not counted in any (e.g. because the image was 
ambiguous or unclear, or because the individual was not engaged in an activity, such as a 
headshot image). 
 
In summary, the content analysis has shown that the most common focus of the images in these 
magazines is people, with images of the in-group (jihadis) more common than ones of the out-
group (the “enemy”). The images of jihadis were overwhelmingly of non-leaders. In four of 
the five magazines, images of individual (non-leader) jihadis were more common than ones of 
groups, and images that portrayed an activity were almost exclusively shows of strength. In 
Dabiq, by contrast, there were more images of groups of (non-leader) jihadis than individual 
ones, and there was a higher frequency of images portraying collective activities (although 
show of strength images were still more common) – which is consistent with the emphasis 
Dabiq placed on the caliphate, coming together under a single leadership and working for the 
ummah. In terms of furthering our analysis of the ‘good Muslim’ identity via examination of 
news values embedded within those images, these findings therefore provide us with a logical 
analytic focus on images of non-leader jihadis.  
 
News values visual analysis 
The results of the news values analysis of the images containing (in focus) non-leader jihadis 
(both individuals and in groups) are presented in Table 7. 
 































































































Table 7 shows that a total of six news values were used in the images across the five 
magazines.90 Of these six, three displayed considerably lower frequencies of use: aesthetics, 
proximity and negativity/superlativeness/impact. The latter had the lowest percentages of use 
overall.91 In Azan, Inspire and Jihad Recollections this value was mostly used in images that 
appeared to show damage that the jihadis had inflicted on their enemies, such as a jihadi 
standing in close physical proximity to the flames of a burning building. In Gaidi Mtaani it 
was used in images that showed jihadis physically present at sites of destruction (e.g. standing 
alongside a large pile of rubble), apparently lamenting a loss that they had suffered. 
As for the news values of aesthetics and proximity, their percentages of use were also 
comparatively low. The latter was only used in more than 10% of the images in two magazines 
– Jihad Recollections (52.3%) and Azan (12.7%) – whilst aesthetics was used in less than 10% 
of the images in all but one of the magazines: Dabiq (14.6%). Many of the images coded under 
aesthetics displayed a poor photographic quality, that is, images that were unfocused, blurry 
and unclear. Although this is at odds with the common descriptions of Dabiq as ‘slick’ and 
‘glossy’, it is likely that (in some instances at least, such as action shots) the magazines used 
this “rough, unpretentious look”92 deliberately given that apparent absence of any sophisticated 
meddling with the reality being photographed creates the impression of naturalness and 
authenticity.93 In addition, the aesthetics value was at times realised via stereotypical ‘Western’ 
social media style filters or animations edited onto/around the image.94 
The remainder of this section examines the three news values that had the highest percentages 
of use across the five magazines, namely (and in decreasing order of frequency): 
personalisation, consonance and prominence. Each of these news values points towards a 
characteristic of the aspirational identity that these magazines visually construct for non-leader 
jihadis, as we discuss next. 
 
The ‘Fulfilled Muslim’. As noted earlier, coding for the news value personalisation also entailed 
examining whether – and, if so, which – emotions were depicted in the images. The findings 
are shown in Table 8.  
 






































































































































The first point that emerges from Table 8 is the infrequency of images of non-leader jihadis 
displaying negative emotions.95 For all five magazines, less than 5% of the images of non-
leader jihadis displayed negative emotions. This, we suggest, may be understood as an effort 
to present religious fulfilment as part of the aspirational identity these magazines seek to 
visually construct. Non-leader jihadis are overwhelmingly presented either as experiencing 
positive emotions such as joy, or neutral emotions such as seriousness. The latter tended to be 
linked to shows of strength, as detailed above. 
Also significant was the differing balance between positive and neutral emotions across the 
magazines. In Azan, Gaidi Mtaani and Jihad Recollections the proportion of these non-leader 
jihadi images that displayed neutral emotions was considerably higher than the proportion 
displaying positive ones (67.3%, 68.7% and 70.6% compared to 20%, 22.2% and 22.8% 
respectively). Whilst Dabiq and Inspire also had a higher proportion of images displaying 
neutral than positive emotions (44.5% and 49.8% compared to 37.2% and 33.8% respectively), 
the proportion displaying positive emotions was markedly higher than in the other three 
magazines. Dabiq and Inspire thus placed greater emphasis on the positive emotions of joy and 
relaxation as the fruit of religious fulfilment. In addition, Dabiq was the only one of the 
magazines that contained more group images displaying positive emotions (n=67; 27.1%) than 
images of individuals (n=25; 10.1%). In contrast to the other magazines, then, Dabiq presented 
the feelings of joy and relaxation that come from religious fulfilment as a communal, not an 
individual, experience.  
 
The ‘Active Muslim’. As Table 7 showed, all five magazines also used the news value 
consonance frequently in images of (non-leader) jihadis. These images depicted jihadis acting 
in according with the group’s principles and teachings, and in particular with the call to violent 
jihad. Table 9 examines the frequency of images portraying (non-leader) jihadis as engaged in 
three specific types of consonant behaviours: saluting, an intimidating pose, and military 
formation. 
 




























































































































* Some images contained more than one display of consonance (e.g. saluting and military 
formation) and so were counted in more than one category. 
 
Of these three consonant behaviours, military formation appeared infrequently. The highest 
figure was for Gaidi Mtaani, in which 5.1% of the non-leader jihadi images depicted them in 
military formation. Saluting images (military salutes/arms aloft in celebration) appeared more 
frequently, although Dabiq (n=32; 13.0%) was the only magazine in which more than 10% of 
the images of non-leader jihadis showed them saluting. By far the most common consonant 
behaviour was an intimidating pose (intense staring/holding weapons/assertive stance), with 
the frequency of such images ranging from 67.3% (in Azan) to 48.7% (in Jihad Recollections). 
Once again, it was noticeable here that – in contrast to the other four magazines – Dabiq placed 
greater emphasis on the collective than the individual. It contained 110 (44.5%) images of 
groups of non-leader jihadis in an intimidating pose, compared to a total of 50 (20.2%) such 
images of individuals. 
Overall, then, the cumulative visual force of these images was to include as part of the 
aspirational identity being constructed an active response to the call to violent jihad. However, 
the portrayal of this active response varied. Whilst all five magazines tended to focus on the 
intimidatory force of the individual(s) engaged in violent jihad, Dabiq again placed greater 
emphasis on the collective nature of this activity than the individual. 
 
The ‘Respected Muslim’. The last of the three most frequent news values across the magazines 
was that of prominence. This was indexed visually via the use of five sub-categories: artefacts 
(e.g. flags, microphone, laptop, mobile); weapons (e.g. guns, tanks, armoured vehicles, 
explosives); religious status (e.g. portrayal of being saintly and/or in heaven); clothing (military 
or prison96) and other (e.g. horses, camels, motorbikes).  The results for all but the ‘other’ 
category, which displayed very low frequency of use across the magazines, are shown in Table 
10. 
 























































































































































* Some images contained more than one display of prominence (e.g. clothing, weapons and 
artefacts) and so were counted in more than one category. 
 
Within the artefacts sub-category, flags were the main object depicted in these images. Flags 
were used in all five magazines to nurture a sense of group identity and as indexes of 
significance for those in their presence. This was particularly prevalent in Dabiq in which 
32.0% (n=79) of the images of (non-leader) jihadis contained the IS flag. In the other 
magazines, the proportion of (non-leader) jihadi images that contained a flag associated with 
the group were considerably lower: Gaidi Mtaani 15.2% (n=15); Azan 10.9% (n=12); Inspire 
8.9% (n=37); and, Jihad Recollections 5.6% (n=11).Whilst this is consistent with Simons’ 
suggestion that the IS flag is used in Dabiq to construct a brand,97 when viewed alongside the 
other prominence markers detailed in Table 10, the repeated use of images that combine the IS 
flag with armed fighters dressed in military style clothing is perhaps better understood as an 
attempt to use national insignia (a flag and armed forces) to reinforce IS’s claim that it had 
achieved the status of a state.  
Across all five magazines, weapons were the most frequently used marker of prominence and 
thus contributed to the construction of the aspirational identity of jihadis as individuals, or 
groups of individuals, who were significant and worthy of respect. The proportion of (non-
leader) jihadi images that used the prominence news value and contained weapons was 
particularly high in Azan, Dabiq, Gaidi Mtaani and Inspire (63.6%, 63.6%, 45.5% and 44.9% 
respectively). The prominence of the individual holding the weapon was frequently 
accentuated still further by the angle of the photograph – looking upwards at the individual – 
and the individual’s body language (e.g., raising an arm or saluting).  
Whilst prominence markers such as artefacts and weapons focus on the here-and-now, the 
religious status marker focused instead on the hereafter, using effects such as superimposing 
blue sky and clouds and/or giving the individual a heavenly glow to portray their status in the 
afterlife. This indicator of prominence was used in four of the magazines, in particular Inspire 
(n=34; 8.2%). This allusion to spiritual benefits in the afterlife is consistent with Inspire’s 
stated objective of inciting attacks in which the perpetrators would be martyred.98  
Finally within the indexes of prominence contributing to the visual construction of an 
aspirational jihadi identity was the use of clothing that marked significance within the jihadist 
groups’ ideology: military and prison clothing (see Table 10 for combined figures). Military 
clothing was either camouflage or black and appropriate for the battlefield; prison clothing was 
usually the stereotypical orange jumpsuits or other obvious prison attire. The low percentages 
of use of clothing that portrayed prominence, especially in Inspire, made us look more closely 
into this category. Table 11 shows the frequency of use of the different clothing types in our 
corpus. 
Table 11: Clothing types across the magazines (non-leader jihadis) 


























































* The principal reasons why the clothing type was unknown in some images were that (a) 
some photos were headshots, and so the clothing was not visible, and (b) the lighting in some 
images made it impossible to see the clothing type. 
** The five columns in this row add up to 198, because one image in this magazine contained 
some jihadis in casual clothing and others in military clothing 
 
As Table 11 shows, the proportion of jihadis wearing military style clothing was noticeably 
higher in Gaidi Mtaani and Dabiq (29.3% and 29.1%) than in the other magazines, particularly 
Inspire (5.8%). This is in keeping with the emphasis placed on territorial objectives by IS and 
Al Shabaab.99 In all five magazines, however, the most common clothing type was casual (t-
shirts, polo shirts, jeans, etc.), with the proportion of images of (non-leader) jihadis showing 
them in casual clothing ranging from 84.3% in Jihad Recollections to 54.5% in Gaidi Mtaani. 
Whilst weapons such as guns, tanks and explosives may seem distant and unfamiliar to Western 
readers of these magazines, the prevalence of casual clothing may, we believe, be understood 
as an attempt to make it easier for these readers to identify with – and aspire to – the magazines’ 
construction of the ‘good Muslim’. 
Perhaps the most striking feature of the clothes worn by the jihadis, across all five magazines, 
was that they were almost invariably unblemished. We did not find a single image of a (non-
leader) jihadi wearing military or prison clothing that was blemished; and across all 39 issues 
of the five magazines there were only twelve images in total in which a (non-leader) jihadi was 
wearing blemished casual clothing. In this sanitised construction, the jihadis’ clothes were 
hardly ever soiled by blood, dirt or even sweat – even when the individuals photographed were 
purportedly celebrating a victory over an enemy group or when the image formed part of a 
eulogy. This is a stark contrast to the images from within these magazines’ pages that claim to 
show Muslims (often children) as victims of violence from enemy groups, which present the 
unsanitised, horrific reality.  
 
Conclusion 
Our image content analysis found that the most common type of image in the online jihadist 
magazines we examined was images of non-leader jihadis. The most commonly used news 
values in this subset of images were personalisation, consonance and prominence. There were 
subtle differences in how these news values were employed. For example, Gaidi Mtaani had a 
relatively greater emphasis on military clothing, military formation and neutral emotions, with 
relatively few saluting images, whilst Inspire had a relatively greater focus on images of 
individual (non-leader) jihadis and used as markers of prominence (military) clothing less and 
religious status more than the other magazines. The most distinctive of the five magazines was 
Dabiq, which had a greater emphasis on positive emotions, (celebratory) salutes and its own 
flag and – above all – focused on the communal over the individual. Common to all the 
magazines, however, was the visual construction of the aspirational identity of the ‘good 
Muslim’. This construct is both a respected figure, indexed by markers of prominence that 
include weapons and other artefacts, and a fulfilled one, who rarely experiences negative 
emotions. Importantly, this fulfilment and respect flows from the active response of the ‘good 
Muslim’ to the call for violent jihad. The three traits are thus inter-connected: fulfilment comes 
from being active, which in turn promises respect. This presents readers with a straightforward 
binary choice: actively respond to the call for violent jihad and enjoy the associated blessings 
of respect and fulfilment; or, by failing to respond, not know this fulfilment and not enjoy this 
respect. The implication for counter-narrative campaigns is the importance of challenging this 
simplistic dichotomy. 
We conclude by offering one suggestion for how this might be done. Analysis of the textual 
content of these magazines has shown how they other the West, creating a dichotomy between 
Muslims and Westerners.100 When this dichotomy is combined with the one that has been 
uncovered in this article – between the ‘good Muslim’ who responds to the call to violent jihad 
and the ‘bad Muslim’ who does not – a more complex set of possibilities is revealed that upsets 
the simplicity of the “bi-polar”101 world these magazines seek to create. There is not only the 
non-Western ‘good’ Muslim and the Western ‘bad’ Muslim who, as part of the out-group, is 
an enemy and faces punishment. There is also the non-Western ‘bad’ Muslim – the member of 
the in-group whose faith is waning and whose backsliding has led him to the verge of 
apostasy.102 And, finally, there is the Western ‘good’ Muslim – a notion that these magazines 
use the claimed incompatibility of Western values and Islamic teaching to dismiss as an 
impossibility, but which counter-narrative campaigns should proactively seek to construct. In 
so doing, our findings have shown that, for such campaigns to be effective, they should not 
only set out what it means to actively live out the Islamic faith but also show that respect and 
fulfilment follow as a result. At a time when Islamophobia features regularly in the media, this 
presents a significant challenge. 
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Appendix 1: news values  
Appendix 1a: Photographic devices for the construction of news values; adapted from 
Bednarek and Caple (2012: 106) and Caple (2013:52-53). 
Photographic 
device 




(indicate high status of 
individuals/organisations/
nations) 
Showing elements like microphones / cameras, media 
scrum, being flanked by entourage; Images depicting 
easily recognisable key figures, people in uniform or 
with other regalia of officialdom; low camera angle 
indicating status of participant in image 
Negativity (the negative 
aspects of an event) 
Images of negative events and their effects – 
disaster/accident/injured/arrests, etc.  
High camera angle, putting viewer in dominant position  
 Proximity (the 
geographical and / or 
cultural nearness of an 
event) 
Images of landmarks, natural features or cultural 
symbols 
 Timeliness (the relevance 
of a story in terms of time) 
Indicated through season/cultural artefacts/signage 
Intensification Superlativeness (the 
maximised or intensified 
aspects of an event) 
Repetition of key elements; e.g., many boats, protest 
signs, police shields 
Extreme emotions in participants 
Placement of elements of different sizes together 
 Superlativeness/ 
Negativity / Impact 
Camera movement and blurring, combined with camera-
people moving around, running,  etc. 
Comparison Superlativeness / Novelty Placement of elements of different sizes next to each 
other; use of specific lens and angle settings to 




(the effects or 
consequences of an event) 
Images showing the after-effects (often negative) of 
events, e.g., scenes of destruction/results of 
Emotions caused by an event. 
 Novelty 
(the unexpected) 
Depictions of people being shocked/surprised 
Juxtaposition of elements in the frame that create a stark 
contrast 
 Personalisation (the 
personal or ‘human 
interest’  aspects of an 
event 
Images of individuals, especially when using close-up 
and showing an emotional response, when not acting in 
a professional role 
 
Consonance (the stereotypical aspect of an 
event) 
Stereotypical imagery of event/person/country 
Aesthetic 
elements 
Aesthetics  Well-composed/aesthetically pleasing images; use of 
variations in shutter speed, aperture, colour, contrast, 
lighting effects, time of the day 
 







Status indicators – Assets that appear in the image and which contribute 
to the appearance of high status in the world of violent jihad. Status 
indicators are further split into the following sub-categories: 
(1) artefacts (e.g. flags, microphone, laptop, mobile);  
(2) weapons (e.g. guns, tanks, armoured vehicles, explosives);  
(3) religious status (e.g. portrayal of being saintly and/or in heaven);   
(4) clothing (military, prison); and, 




Whether or not the jihadi(s) in the image are close to conflicts, accidents, 
damage, injuries, disasters or wars. Destruction is shown by dead/injured 
bodies, smoke, fire, rubble and explosions (or a mix of these). The 
destruction is mostly large-scale to emphasise strength and power.  Superlativeness 
 
Impact  
Proximity As the magazines’ target audience includes those in the West, inclusion 
of Western landmarks or cultural symbols. This ‘close to home’ effect 
could be part of a psychological strategy to intimidate the enemies of the 
terrorists, and could also have a ‘relatable’ effect for potential Western 
sympathisers. Proximity was shown by one or a combination of images 
of Western cities/countries, Western symbols/landmarks, and Western 
attacks (e.g., 9/11 or the Boston Bombing).  
 
Novelty The unexpected aspects of an event. Depictions of people being 
surprised.  
Timeliness The relevance of a story in terms of time. 
Personalisation The emotion conveyed by the jihadi(s) in the image, if identifiable. 
Three main emotion groups were identified: positive, neutral, negative.   
Consonance Body language or positioning conveyed by the jihadi(s) in the image that 
are (stereo)typical of violent jihadism, including 
(1) saluting (including military salutes and arms aloft in celebration);  
(2) intimidating pose (one or a combination of: intense staring, holding 
weapons, and assertive stance);  
(3) standing in military formation. 
 
Aesthetics Images that are well-composed and aesthetically pleasing: use of 
variations in shutter speed, aperture, colour, contrast, lighting effects, 
time of day.  
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